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Abstract
Although postcommunist countries share a common past, the variability o f 
outcomes in both democracy and economic reform  is very large in the re­
gion. Only a few countries have become W estern-type democracies in Cen­
tra l and Eastern Europe and the Baltic. By contrast, the norm  is clearly no t 
democracy fo r o the r Soviet successor states. In this article, the au thor a ttr i­
butes this variation to  differences in the infrastructural capacity o f the state. 
Using both quantitative and qualitative analyses w ith in  26 postcommunist 
countries, the author argues tha t fo r democracy to  flourish, the state must 
firs t possess the necessary means to  maintain law and o rde r and to  p rotect 
the rights o f citizens, in o the r words, to  ensure the maintenance and delivery 
o f essential public goods.The results show tha t the links between a strong 
state tha t has been able to  apply a definitive set o f rules and democratic 
institutions are clear.
Keywords
state capacity, democratization, postcommunism, transition
1GESIS— Leibniz Institut fü r Sozialwissenschaften, Mannheim, Germany 
Corresponding Author:
Jessica Fortin, GESIS— Leibniz Institut fü r Sozialwissenschaften, Postfach 12 21 SS, 
Mannheim D-68072, Germany 
Email: jessica.fortin@gesis.org
904 Comparative Political Studies 45(7)
For an increasing number of contributors to the discipline, the connection 
between a strong state and democratic institutions is obvious (Bunce, 2000; 
Fukuyama, 2004; Hashim, 2005; Hendley, 1997; Holmes, 1997; Huber, 
Rueschemeyer, & Stephens, 1999; Kaufman, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996; 
O ’Donnell, 1993; Przeworski, 1995; Roberts & Sherlock, 1999; Sharlet, 
1998; Suleiman, 1999; Tilly, 2007; Wang, 1999). As Linz and Stepan (1996) 
argue, an effective state is essential to support the other building blocks of 
democratic consolidation (civil, political, economic, and the rule of law). In 
other words, for democracy to flourish, the state must possess the means nec­
essary to maintain the rule of law, to protect the rights o f citizens, and to regu­
late economic transactions. However compelling in theory, this proposition 
has never been rigorously tested in the context of postcommunist countries.
In this article, I argue that postcommunist patterns of state capacity offer 
crucial insights into the types of regimes—democratic or authoritarian—that 
emerged after the downfall of communism. For this purpose, I draw on a 
mixture of qualitative and quantitative methodologies to evaluate how well 
this hypothesis reflects the reality of postcommunist transformations. Using 
a five-item index of state capacity as the main independent variable, I 
demonstrate the importance of state capacity for regime outcomes in two 
steps. First, I establish state capacity as a necessary condition for democracy, 
using a qualitative method to test probabilistic hypotheses: the methodology 
of necessary conditions as developed by Braumoeller and Goertz (2000). In a 
second step, I perform time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) estimations on 26 
countries from 1989 to 2006 to explain levels of democracy and confirm the 
patterns observed in the first step. Following this demonstration, I conduct 
additional tests to assess the direction of the causality between the variables 
included in this study.
The combined results of these analyses lead to three interconnected con­
clusions. First, effective state capacity seems to be a necessary—but not 
sufficient— condition for democracy. Postcommunist countries with com­
paratively high levels of initial state capacity at the time of transition, under­
stood via proxy of the quality of provision of a basic class of public goods, 
were more likely to move toward democracy. Second, when explored in a 
multivariate design accounting for the effect of time, the empirical connec­
tion between state capacity and democracy remains robust among postcom­
munist countries. On one hand, the links between a strong state that has been 
able to apply a definitive set o f rules and democratic institutions are clear. 
On the other hand, where state capacity was more limited after indepen­
dence was gained, democracy was a less likely outcome. Finally, however, 
the direction o f causality among variables cannot be established in a
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unidirectional way, which indicates that state capacity and levels o f democ­
racy likely have mutually constitutive and self-reinforcing effects.
How State Capacity Influences Democratization
A growing body of literature proposes causal mechanisms linking quality of 
democracy to state capacity The most influential of such recent theoretical 
developments is what Grzymala-Busse (2007) has termed robust competi­
tion, where high levels o f competition among political parties during the 
postcommunist period explain why state resources were less exploited by 
ruling coalitions in Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, and Lithuania, by 
contrast with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, and Bulgaria. In the 
former group of countries, opposition parties have been vocal and critical in 
all successive governments as of 1990, even managing to successfully 
monitor the level of state exploitation. Grzymala-Busse’s argument goes 
together with studies by Weingast and Moran (1983) as well as Keefer and 
Stasavage (2000), who argue that the credibility of governments not to 
renege on their policy commitments is enhanced by the presence of veto 
players. Similar to these works, Heilman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) also 
contend that levels of state capture can be kept in check by sufficiently devel­
oped civil societies.
Expanding on an earlier literature linking levels o f corruption and democ­
racy, Bäck and Hadenius’ (2008) as well as Charron and Lapuente (2010) 
propose quantitative demonstrations on a large number of countries using an 
improved measurement of state capacity.1 Although the empirical connec­
tions between democracy and state capacity are strong in these works, some 
of the theoretical implications of these studies’ findings make it necessary to 
question the direction of the causal relationship under study. Both studies 
observe a /-shaped or curvilinear relationship between democracy and 
administrative performance. As in Grzymala-Busse’s argument, in countries 
already above a certain threshold of democracy, further democratization has 
positive effects on the state’s administrative capacity. On the flip side, and 
more problematic, this reasoning would entail that in highly authoritarian 
countries, democratization would serve to reduce state capacity, and in the 
case of semiauthoritarian regimes, democratization would then have no effect 
on state capacity (Bäck & Hadenius, 2008, pp. 20-21).
To explain these puzzling findings, I propose to look at the reverse causal 
mechanism: At low levels o f state capacity, democratization is simply less 
likely, not so much the opposite. In the face of a curvilinear relationship, it 
makes sense to propose a criterion of effective state capacity as a pillar to a
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polity’s potential to democratize, implying that some level of capacity is 
required for a functioning democracy If there is no organized and competent 
state authority even highly mobilized citizens cannot possibly influence 
policies. In such settings, the state will not be in a position to carry out basic 
policies, much less social policies that require even higher state capacity for 
effective implementation (Huber et al., 1999). Based on this, I argue that the 
likelihood of a state becoming and remaining democratic is considerably 
higher when it possesses the means necessary to maintain the distribution of 
a basic class of public goods. Although effective state capacity can reason­
ably be considered a necessary condition for democratization, strong states 
do not automatically produce democratic regimes, nor do they guarantee their 
survival. Far from being a sufficient condition for democracy a strong or 
capable state was also theorized to be indispensable for the maintenance of 
stable autocratic rule ( Way, 2005); this would explain the curvilinear relation­
ships observed in previous research.
A crucial point of departure in understanding postcommunist trajectories 
of reform and democratic performance is the fact that conditions of state 
infrastructure were not uniform across the different countries, especially 
between Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and Soviet repub­
lics. In the case of Soviet republics, most of which had never experienced 
independent statehood before, the concentration of formal governing insti­
tutions of the Soviet Union in Moscow, in the shape of All-Union Ministries 
and Union-Republic Ministries, meant that each one needed to fill a sub­
stantial institutional vacuum in a short period after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. The disappearance of the Communist Party— the main insti­
tution of oversight— also left a void. In some of the successor republics that 
have experienced heavy state engineering, we find intense ethnic strife, con­
flict, territorial divisions, contested territories, and groups such as clans that 
can pose a real challenge to the authority of the central government. Georgia 
and Tajikistan, for instance, suffered from serious malfunctions at the time of 
their emergence, whereas Moldova and Azerbaijan have also struggled to 
enforce sovereignty over their secessionist enclaves. Yet these patterns are 
not common to all former Soviet republics. Belarus and Ukraine emerged 
from the Soviet Union with comparatively more capable state administra­
tions, however burdened with deep-rooted corruption.
Soviet-induced state engineering was less sweeping in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Some boundaries were certainly shifted as a result of the conclusion 
of World War II, but Moscow did not impose massive changes to facilitate the 
establishment of its authority like the carving of states from scratch in Central 
Asia.2 Most important, despite the de facto control of the Soviet Union, CEE
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countries retained local control over the apparatus of the state. The administra­
tion, the treasury, and the courts, despite the application of socialist law every­
where, remained in the hands of national elites. Given their sovereign status, 
most institutions of the state such as the military, the police, and core national 
ministries, in particular the institutions of taxation, already existed and did not 
need to be created anew in 1989. When CEE countries recovered their auton­
omy from Moscow, they faced fewer acute challenges than in the former 
Soviet Union, where leaders were confronted with the additional burden of 
having to affirm and enforce the newfound authority of the state on their terri­
tory. Although this represented an advantage over most former Soviet repub­
lics, it must nevertheless be stressed that CEE countries were not immediately 
consolidated or stable in the 1990s (Grzymala-Busse & Jones Luong, 2002), 
nor were they exempt from issues related to limited state capacity (Ganev, 
2007). In fact, all eight EU accession candidates had to undergo a fair amount 
of state building, understood as the administrative capacity to implement the 
acquis, as a condition for admission (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2008).
My contention here is that some of these conditions of state infrastructure 
precede, to a certain degree, the kind of liberalization that followed (or did 
not follow) the fall o f CEE communist parties and the USSR: There was 
much variation in the capacity of successor states and, as a result, in the chal­
lenges new, or incumbent, rulers faced in establishing state authority on their 
respective sovereign territories. There were generally fewer constraints on 
leaders where the capacity of the state was higher: The continuous delivery of 
public goods made it less probable that state authority would come under any 
serious strain. Leaders’ capabilities for reform were greatest in postcommu­
nist countries where the successor state had the ability to apply a definitive 
set of rules early on and, by extension, to build channels of political support. 
These conditions would facilitate a power transition that precluded a single 
group of actors wanting to secure access to the state’s power resources to lock 
in their victory in an unbalanced constitution.
Where the capabilities of the state were more limited after the collapse of 
communism, democracy was a more difficult outcome to achieve. In such 
cases, leaders tended to compensate for state weakness by enlarging and arrang­
ing their powers vertically. Leaders in times of crisis often claim the nation 
needs firm and decisive leadership that stands above the partisan way and can 
pursue the national interest more directly, in addition to providing more imme­
diate benefits for society (Smith, 2005). The most illustrative example was 
Boris Yeltsin’s refusal to surrender the emergency decree powers he had been 
granted in 1990 and his heavy use of such tools between 1992 and 1994 to 
enact privatization that benefited a group of insiders. His successor, Vladimir
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Putin, also entered the presidential office with the overt goal o f strengthening 
or consolidating vertical authority, an undertaking that went hand in hand with 
an increase in authoritarian practices (Holmes, 2006, p. 301 ). Facing weak state 
infrastructures in the early 1990s, executives in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and 
Central Asia also quickly moved to impose a vertical control structure over 
regional and local administrations, hence thwarting the rise of credible checks. 
In these settings executives were freer to rely on state resources for patronage 
and co-optation to gain allies and buy off political opponents.
The establishment of institutions of oversight can have two potential facil­
itators in postcommunist countries. On the one hand, the early establishment 
of such institutions can result from “robust competition,” where political par­
ties establish tools to monitor state institutions (Grzymala-Busse, 2007). On 
the other hand, I believe the likelihood that institutions of oversight will 
emerge, and how binding these institutions are designed to be, is also linked 
to existing levels o f state capacity. States inheriting corrupt and ineffective 
bureaucracies, large informal economies, and a severely impaired ability to 
finance their activities will face more difficulties in establishing functioning 
agencies to oversee privatization, securities and exchange commissions, 
courts staffed with competent personnel, law enforcement, national account­
ing offices, and other such institutions that are crucial to forestall the abuse of 
power. Although Grzymala-Busse (2007) argues convincingly that some for­
mer communist states are weak because they failed to implement these insti­
tutions fast enough, if at all, the flip side of the coin is that most such states 
were already weak at the onset o f independence and faced additional con­
straints in establishing these institutions. It therefore becomes difficult to dis­
entangle a factor that existed previously and is unequivocally casual, as I 
demonstrate in the following analyses.
Cases and Measures
To estimate the two corollary hypotheses according to which state capacity 
is a necessary condition for democracy and that the establishment of demo­
cratic regimes is more likely in capable states than weaker ones, I employ a 
mixture of qualitative and quantitative techniques using the following 26 
cases: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Moldova, 
Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The coupling of qualitative and 
quantitative tests allows me to tackle the issue of complex causality by har­
nessing the strength of different approaches to causation.
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State Capacity
I propose to capture the concept of state capacity via proxy of the quality of 
the provision of public goods given their crucial role in establishing state 
authority on territories (Spruyt, 1994). This conceptualization is anchored in 
a minimal definition of the concept of state capacity, solely in terms of infra­
structural power. Here, infrastructural power is defined as “the institutional 
capacity of a central state, despotic or not, to penetrate its territories and 
logistically implement decisions” (Mann, 1993, p. 59). This understanding of 
state capacity is operationalized by examining the quality of provision of a 
class of collective goods even a minimally redistributive state should theo­
retically provide, as proposed by recent work (Fortin, 2010). Rather than 
focusing on the measurement of absolute resources, this approach assumes 
that it is insufficient that a state should possess important human and natural 
resources for the production of wealth: It must also be able to effectively 
make use of those resources. As well, this intentionally leaves aside the des­
potic or coercive power of states since such aspects of power do not neces­
sarily go hand in hand with infrastructural power.
The index used in this article is based on the aggregation of five indica­
tors, rather than the single or two-indicator measures proposed in previous 
studies. The indicators retained are progress in infrastructure reform 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development(EBRD), levels of 
corruption (Heritage Foundation), the quality of property rights protection 
(Heritage Foundation), and the ratio of Contract Intensive M oney (CIM), 
calculated from International M onetary Fund financial statistics. Last but 
not least, the delivery o f such public goods depends on the crucial factor of 
funding. Thus, a state’s ability to collect taxes will be paramount to the 
delivery of public goods and consequently a core measure of state capacity. 
I use the ratio of tax revenue to GDP to illustrate state taxing capacity. To 
make the final index, all indicators were standardized and combined to be 
used as a single measure. Factor and correlation analyses revealed that the 
association among the items is strong, that they measure a similar latent 
construct, and therefore that the combination of these items in a composite 
index is the best option in the present case.3
Regime Outcome
Most observers agree that no single index of democracy offers an adequate 
solution to all three challenges of conceptualization, measurement, and 
aggregation, accompanying the transformation of an abstract concept into a
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measurable indicator (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002, p. 28). However what ulti­
mately constrains researchers in choosing a quantitative measurement of 
democracy is data availability. Since only two studies offer coverage from 
1989 continuously until 2006, the dependent variable used in the present 
study is an additive combination of Freedom House (2008) scores and the 
Polity IV index (Marshall & Jaggers, 2009) in a single composite measure.4 
By grouping the two indices, I hope to maximize both the validity and the 
reliability of the composite index since Freedom House uses a maximalist 
definition of democracy and Polity a more restrictive one. In particular, 
Freedom House (2008) considers characteristics such as socioeconomic 
rights, freedom from gross socioeconomic inequalities, and freedom from 
war. Polity’s coding of democracy is based on an assessment of the com­
petitiveness of political participation, the regulation of political participation, 
the competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, and the con­
straints placed on the chief executive. Therefore, combining both indices will 
serve to alleviate problems of systematic and random measurement errors 
undoubtedly present when the two measures are considered separately.
State Capacity as a Necessary 
Condition for Democracy
The first step in testing the hypothesis of state capacity as a necessary condi­
tion for the establishment of democracy consists in visually inspecting the 
graphical representation of both variables of interest. Figure 1 presents aver­
age values of state capacity during the period 1989-2006 with combined 
Freedom House scores in 2006. The two vertical lines represent Freedom 
House’s classification cutoffs (respectively, free, partially free, and not free), 
whereas the horizontal line simply is the mean of state capacity over time. 
The distribution of cases in Figure 1 offers clear evidence (Pearson’s r = 
-.80) in favor of the state capacity hypothesis as most cases, except FYROM, 
fall neatly within three categories. As expected, the relationship between the 
two variables of interest is not straightforward but slightly curvilinear as 
illustrated by the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (lowess) smooth 
regression line. The most important finding is that nearly all regimes classi­
fied as “free” by Freedom House are located in the upper-left cell o f the 
graph. Conversely, all authoritarian and semiauthoritarian regimes are posi­
tioned in the lower half of the state capacity quadrant.
Figure 1 only provides a partial confirmation of Lucan Way’s (2005) claim 
that “key elements of a strong state are critical for maintaining nondemo- 
cratic rule” (p. 235). Belarus and Uzbekistan, the two most repressive
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Figure I . Average state capacity 1989-2006 and democracy in 2006
regimes, indeed display higher state capacity scores than all other autocra­
cies. Yet it is crucial to notice that both exhibit much lower scores than 
democracies and that a highly repressive regime, Turkmenistan, displays a 
low overall state capacity score. Although democracies are neatly clustered in 
the upper-left comer of the graph, we notice that variability in state capacity 
scores increases as we move toward the more authoritarian end of the spec­
trum. The direction of the lowess regression line changes in the bottom right 
cells: State capacity becomes weakly associated with more repressive regimes 
but with too many outliers to offer unambiguous evidence.
Technically, FYROM’s positioning in the top-middle cell could require 
discarding the necessary causation hypothesis altogether since in many nec­
essary causation tests, we should reject the theory on the discovery of a single 
counterexample. However, such a strict approach to testing for necessary
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conditions is likely counterproductive in the present situation, not only 
because of the arbitrariness of the position of category lines but also because 
of possible measurement errors and the fact that these figures correspond to 
averages over time. The arbitrariness of the horizontal line has two potential 
consequences for necessary causation testing. Given their median position in 
Figure 1, Romania, FYROM, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus could be 
grouped either with the more capable states or with the less capable states, a 
problem that often arises when continuous concepts are dichotomized and 
assigned a discrete boundary (Braumoeller & Goertz, 2000). The same argu­
ment also undeniably applies to the classification of democracies and nonde­
mocracies; it is not clear where the border of demarcation between 
democracies and nondemocracies should be located or whether the establish­
ment of a truly discrete empirical cutoff is even possible.
Table 1 presents the results from Figure 1 in a four-cell table to test for 
necessary or sufficient causes. Observation of Table 1 reveals, unsurprisingly, 
that the data do not satisfy the sufficient causation requisites. In particular, for 
state capacity to be a sufficient cause of democracy, we should find some 
cases located in cell A whereas no cases should be present in cell C (cells B 
and D are not considered in this design). Because authoritarian regimes can 
also be a plausible outcome in strong states, state capacity is not a sufficient 
cause for democracy. Using the positive outcome design, where the analyst 
focuses only on cases where the outcome variable is present (Braumoeller & 
Goertz, 2000; Dion, 1998; Ragin, 1998, 2000) to test for necessary condi­
tions, we observe that democracy has occurred only in countries displaying a 
certain level of state capacity. The presence of variation in both independent 
and dependent variables further indicates that state capacity is a nontrivial 
necessary condition to democracy.
According to rules of the All Cases Design (Seewright, 2002) for estab­
lishing necessary causation, all valid cases should be distributed in cells A, C, 
and D, whereas no cases should be found in cell B: The pattern outlined in 
Table 1 satisfies these requirements. Using simple models of Bayesian infer­
ence where we set prior probabilities that the necessary condition is true, the 
results from these data are consistent with the necessary causation pattern. In 
a model where we have no reason to believe that either hypothesis is more 
likely to be confirmed, the confidence level that the present data are consis­
tent with the necessary causation pattern is 97%.5 In other words, we can be 
confident with a level of 97% that the data are generated in a pattern that is 
consistent with necessary causation even in the face of conservative priors.6 
Further confirmation of these findings will be established in the following 
section using TSCS estimations.
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Table I . Necessary and Sufficient Cause Design
Democracy Cell A  (12) Cell B (0)
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Croatia
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Mongolia
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Nondemocracy Cell C (1) Cell D (13)
FYROM Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Stronger states Weaker states
Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analyses
Pooled time-series and cross-sectional (TSCS) estimations are sensible 
when cross-national and temporally comparable quantitative indicators are 
only available for a short period and for a small group of countries (fixed, 
not sampled). Although it offers clear sample size advantages, the pooling 
of time series from a number of cross-sectional units can increase estimation 
difficulties. While the data are not temporally dominant, the nature of the
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units and the arguably endogenous variables all point toward probable het- 
eroscedasticity. When time-series data are pooled from geographic entities, 
cross-sectionally correlated errors can become more problematic (Kmenta, 
1971). More precisely, the variance of error processes likely differs from 
unit to unit. To reduce the risks associated with overconfidence in the per­
formance of estimators, the following analyses are performed using TSCS 
models o f linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck & 
Katz, 1995).
In the following analyses, I estimate three models using varying specifi­
cations to test the robustness of the state capacity hypothesis. First, I esti­
mate a base model o f regime outcome containing regressors of state 
capacity, levels of development captured by GDP per capita, and the role of 
the European Union, crudely measured as the distance of each country’s 
capital to Brussels. To curb the problem of spurious correlations arising 
when certain values of the dependent variable vary independently, but in 
the same consistent direction over time, I include a trend variable. This 
trend variable, the number of years elapsed since independence from com­
munism, will also serve to capture effects of maturation and regime devel­
opment that can account for some extent o f variance in regime outcomes. 
Following this initial setup, I then add a lagged value of the dependent 
variable (LDV) in a second model to control for autocorrelation. Third and 
last, I include a series of country dummy variables for each unit of the 
pooled model. TSCS equations suppose that countries are homogeneous, 
that is, that they differ only in levels of explanatory variables they possess, 
an unreasonable assumption in the case at hand. The least square dummy 
variable estimators (LSDV) will account for the possibility of intercept dif­
ferences across units but also for variance from potentially influential vari­
ables that were left out o f the model (Hicks, 1994; Judge, Griffiths, Carter 
Hill, Lutkepohl, & Lee, 1985).7 This last model specification should pro­
vide the strongest test o f the robustness of the coefficient of state capacity 
in the face of an overspecified model.
Data Imputation
Despite being high in validity and reliability, the index of state capacity I 
employ as an independent variable in the following models suffers from an 
important weakness: Missing data in the early years of transition. On the 
potential 432 cases the present analyses could benefit from, a mere 263 
remain when full models are estimated, even if only 5% of cases are missing. 
The majority of missing cases is distributed in the extremities of the time
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variable and in the least advanced countries, and they are therefore not miss­
ing at random. Here, listwise deletion is a substandard alternative for three 
reasons. First, listwise deletion would be especially damaging given the 
distribution of the missing cases in the first year of independence since this 
would remove much crucial information about the early 1990s from the final 
analyses and, consequently, render it impossible to perform appropriate tests 
for the hypothesis. Second, the concentration of missing cases in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus would undoubtedly introduce systematic bias in esti­
mating the effects of low state capacity on outcome variables. Last, because 
TSCS requires a minimum of continuous panel information to produce reli­
able estimates, listwise deletion would reduce country observations and 
introduce gaps between years in a way that is insufficient to produce reliable 
estimates.8
To mitigate the problem of missing data, I chose to impute a portion of the 
cases (for tax revenue and contract intensive money) using (Honaker, King, 
& Blackwell, 2009; King, Honaker & Scheve, 2001), the best option avail­
able to generate plausible and unbiased results ( Allison, 2000).9 In the case of 
corruption levels, and the quality of private property protection, I chose a 
more conservative data interpolation technique where starting values are 
similar to the first year of actual data coverage by Heritage Foundation (in 
most cases around 1995). The hypothesis underlying the interpolation is that 
in no case were the scores for these indicators higher in early years of transi­
tion: They were likely lower, or the same as a few years after, at best. The 
final index of state capacity therefore contains both actual measurements and 
estimated measurements of individual indicators and should therefore be 
handled and interpreted with a measure of prudence in the very early years. 
With this, I believe the advantages of using estimates produced from this 
approximate information clearly outweigh the option of dropping nonrandom 
cases.
Findings
Estimation results o f the baseline state capacity model are presented in the 
first column of Table 2, whereas the two alternative models, one including an 
LDV variable as well as a third containing LSDV estimators, are displayed 
in the last two columns. For all models presented, the upper section of the 
table represents estimates of the parameters of the causal factors included in 
the regression. Where applicable, the middle section of the table represents 
nation-specific intercepts, net o f the effects of the other independent vari­
ables. Since I have suppressed the constant in the model concerned (Model
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Table 2.Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analyses of the Effect of State Capacity on 
Regime Outcomes
Independent
variable
Model 1: Baseline Model 2: LDV Model 3: LSDV
OLS est. PCSE OLS est. PCSE OLS est. PCSE
Regime 0.789*** (0.043) q 4 4 |* * * (0.044)
outcome(
Time elapsed 0.030*** (0.009) -0.009*** (0.004) 0 .0 0 2 (0.004)
GDP per 0.179*** (0.046) 0.001 (0.016) 0.148*** (0.036)
capita
Distance to -0.3 15*** (0.046) -0.049*** (0.016)
EU
State capacity 0.257*** (0.088) 0.206*** (0.036) 0.068* (0.039)
Albania -0.388 (0.384)
Armenia -0.520 (0.361)
Azerbaijan _ | | 3 4 ** * (0.371)
Belarus - 1.034*** (0.207)
Bulgaria 0.712*** (0.394)
Croatia -0.635 (0.224)
Czech -0.074 (0.454)
Republic
Estonia -0.295 (0.438)
Georgia -0.376 (0.358)
Hungary -0.105 (0.441)
Kazakhstan — | 140*** (0.396)
Kyrgyz -0.740** (0.325)
Republic
Latvia -0.166 (0.432)
Lithuania -0.037 (0.437)
FYROM -0.345 (0.402)
Moldova -0.280 (0.320)
Mongolia -0.027 (0.321)
Poland 0.130 (0.438)
Romania -0.236 (0.402)
Slovak -0.144 (0.438)
Republic
Slovenia - 0.1 12 (0.486)
Tajikistan - 1.026*** (0.309)
Turkmenistan - 1.485*** (0.377)
(continued)
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Table 2. (continued)
Independent
variable
Model 1 : Baseline Model 2: LDV Model 3: LSDV
OLS est. PCSE OLS est. PCSE OLS est. PCSE
Ukraine -0.349 (0.362)
Uzbekistan -1.455*** (0.355)
Constant 0.183** (0.096) 0.198*** (0.040)
N 432 406 406
Number of 26 26 26
countries
Obs. per 16.62 15.62 15.62
group avg.
Rho .75 .27 .2 2
Adj. R2 .28 .8 8 .95
OLS = ordinary least squares; PCSE = panel-corrected standard e rro r; LDV = lagged depen­
dent variable; LSDV = least square dummy variable.Table entries are un standardized regression 
coefficients from atime-series cross-sectional analysis using PCSEs (in parentheses) performed 
on five imputed data sets using Kenneth Scheve’s “ miest”  program in Stata 10.0. Rho and R2 
values represent the average o f five models ran separately.
*p < .10.**p  < .05.***p  < .01 .
3), these represent the actual intercepts of the groups and can be directly 
interpreted as such. These additions allow for slope heterogeneity of state 
capacity effects across nations. Last, the lower section of the table displays 
the goodness-of-fit and residual statistics.
The baseline model (Model 1) in the first column of Table 2 provides 
unambiguous support for the principal proposition regarding the importance 
of state capacity for democracy: The parameter estimate for state capacity is 
positive and significant. Also as expected, the coefficient acting as a proxy 
for EU influence is negative and significant. As well, the parameter estimate 
for the time elapsed is also positive and significant, provisionally suggesting 
that countries are becoming more democratic over time. Last, the coefficient 
depicting level o f development (GDP/capita) is also significant and positive. 
The overall fit of the model is moderate, with an (average) adjusted R 2 of .28, 
leaving ample space for model improvement.
A LDV was added to the baseline model in Model 2 to alleviate the high 
level o f serial correlation of the errors visible in Model 1 (Beck & Katz, 
1996).10 Because of the real causal impact that past values of democracy
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have on subsequent scores, the inclusion of such an item is theoretically 
justified. In addition, because a LDV also serves as a proxy by picking up 
some of the unmeasured variables, its addition is also empirically sound 
(Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994). As it was to be expected with a model 
presenting some amount of serial autocorrelation, the LDV became the 
dominant explanatory factor in Model 2, absorbing much of the strength of 
the other variables and dramatically improving the adjusted R 2 (Achen, 
2000). However, even with the inclusion of this autoregressive term, the 
parameter estimate for state capacity remains statistically significant, 
despite underestimated effects attributable to the LDV. Yet the inclusion of 
the LDV has considerable impacts on the other independent variables: The 
parameter estimate for GDP per capita loses statistical significance, whereas 
the sign o f the parameter estimate for the variable depicting trend is 
reversed.
Results from Models 1 and 2 confirm previous research concerning the 
role of the EU being strongly associated with positive democratic progress 
(Cameron, 2007; Dimitrovna & Pridham, 2004; Grzymala-Busse & Jones 
Luong, 2002; Kopstein & Reilly, 2003; Risse, Green Cowles, & Caporaso, 
2001; Vachudova, 2005, 2010).11 Although I recognize these important con­
tributions as well as the value of adding this information to avoid omitted 
variable bias, “proximity to the EU” measured in distance has limited validity 
and raises issues of multicollinearity. The strong association between each 
country dummy and distance to Brussels suggests that this item encapsulates 
many other unobserved phenomena that are specific to each country and not 
necessarily related to the EU. Given the crudeness of the measurement, not­
withstanding the laudable theoretical underpinnings of existing research, I 
would advise readers to employ a conservative approach to interpreting these 
parameter estimates as purely depicting the effects of the EU’s leverage on 
regime outcomes.
Since Models 1 and 2 do not necessarily contain all the variables influenc­
ing regime outcomes, the addition of country-specific variables in Model 3 
serves to alleviate remaining concerns of model heterogeneity and doubles as 
a two-way fixed effects model.12 Overall, Model 3 explains close to 95% of 
the linear variation in regime outcomes in postcommunist countries, which 
indicates that models that integrate state capacity, levels of development, and 
country-specific variables manage an almost perfect fit to the data and would 
unlikely benefit from additional variables.13 Given that parameter estimates 
from TSCS models encompass the combined average partial effect o f the 
cross-section dimension and time, their substantive meaning is less readily 
interpretable than in traditional cross-section models (Firebaugh, 1980;
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Kittel, 1999). Although it is impossible to determine the exact magnitude of 
the relative contribution of each dimension to the parameter estimates, the 
robustness of the state capacity variable in the models holding country effects 
constant can be considered as evidence of developments over time that are 
common to all cases (Kittel & Winner, 2005).
A surprising finding concerns the coefficients for the trend variable which 
are unstable between the three models. The positive trend noted in Model 1 
reverses on the addition of the LDV (Model 2) and is too insubstantial to 
remain statistically significant when country dummy variables are added 
(Model 3). It appears then, all things being equal, that although postcommu­
nist regimes have tended to become more democratic over time when we 
look at overall democracy scores, this improvement is not the result of time 
itself but rather changes in the other factors included in the fully specified 
model. The weakness of the variable representing time in the face of a fully 
specified model suggests that democratic development was neither unidirec­
tional nor automatic in the region.
In an article reviewing the evidence in favor of modernization theory 
(Lipset, 1959), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) demonstrated that economic 
development alone accounted for more variance in democracy than any of the 
other variables they included in their model, a finding that echoed many ear­
lier studies on the topic (Bollen, 1979; Bollen & Jackman, 1985; Brunk, 
Caldeira, & Lewis-Beck, 1987; Jackman, 1973).14 The present study nearly 
replicates these findings. The variable depicting levels of development is sta­
tistically significant in the baseline and fully specified models, even in the 
face of very high multicollinearity, although it temporarily loses statistical 
significance in the presence of a LDV in the model (Model 2).15 Despite the 
strong association between state capacity and GDP per capita,16 and the prob­
lematic multicollinearity brought by the LSDV, both variables retain statisti­
cal significance in the flooded model (Model 3), allowing us to disentangle 
some independent effects of state capacity and levels of development on 
regime outcomes. Under such conditions, the fact that the coefficient depict­
ing levels o f state capacity retains some explanatory power, even in an over­
specified model, demonstrates beyond much doubt that it is one of the key 
variables explaining regime outcomes.
A  Further Exploration of Causality
On the whole, and over time, the index of state capacity is a strong predictor 
of levels o f democracy. However, this close connection raises a last, but 
nontrivial, methodological concern over the direction of causality. The issue
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Table 3. Results From Granger Causality Testing
Dependent: Democracy Dependent: State capacity
Variable Coefficient t Variable Coefficient t
Democracy t 
State capacity t 
Democracy
0 .8 8 ** *  
0. 15* * *
Q
45.2
6.23
32.36
Democracy t 
State capacity t 
Democracy
0.05* * *
09
0.08* * *
3.74
48.23
4.13
State capacity q  20* * * 6.41 State capacity t 0.87* * * 36.71
Cells contain results from  fou r ordinary least squares regressions performed on tw o  different 
dependent variables. Regressions fo r I-year lags were performed separately from 2-year lags. 
Estimates were obtained from one of five imputed data sets. Nevertheless, the same estima­
tions performed in the o ther fou r data sets allow very close replication of the above table. 
***p <.01.
is particularly thorny here because of the impossibility of establishing an 
experimental design to isolate time order of exposure to the independent 
variable, thus unequivocally demonstrating directional causality One alter­
native way of establishing the direction of causation is to perform Granger 
causality tests (Granger, 1969). Granger causality evaluates only whether a 
phenomenon happens before another and helps predict it, but it does not 
represent the concept causality in any other deeper theoretical sense 
(Granger, 1980). This test is conducted by regressing the dependent variable 
(v ) on lagged values of y  and an independent variable (x ). The null
t  t -K  __  t-fC
hypothesis is that x  does not Granger cause (g-cause) y :  This null hypoth­
esis can be rejected when one or more of the lagged values of x  are signifi­
cant. Table 3 presents the results from the estimations performed according 
to the above specifications.
In the present case, results indicate that state capacity (x ) g-causes 
democracy (v ) but that democracy (v ) also g-causes state capacity (x );17 we 
are facing a feedback stochastic system where causality is not unidirectional 
and values from both variables help predict future values in the other.ls 
Substantially, the causal arrow between state capacity and democracy is 
likely to run in both directions. Feedback effects are undoubtedly present. As 
demonstrated by Grzymala-Busse (2007), the causal arrow also runs from 
democracy or party competition to state capacity. In her analysis of postcom­
munist state reconstruction, Grzymala-Busse showed that opportunistic 
behavior by ruling parties was curbed in the presence of robust political 
oppositions, a point similar to Heilman et al.’s (2000) finding that levels of 
state capture can be kept in check by sufficiently developed civil societies.
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Thus, the building of formal state institutions of monitoring and oversight 
was a more likely outcome in the most competitive systems. Conversely, 
unchecked governing coalitions have tended to engage in more resource 
exploitative, clientelistic, and rent-seeking behavior. Consequently, ruling 
parties in uncompetitive settings fashioned state institutions that facilitated 
such predatory behavior by thwarting the development of formal institutions 
of monitoring and oversight.
Discussion and Conclusions
The view I proposed in this article is essentially state centric, not, however, 
because I believe other factors are less relevant to explain postcommunist 
democratization. The role of civil society, formal political institutions, val­
ues held by key elites and elite constellations, feelings of national unity and 
ethnic strife, levels o f development, contagion effects, political parties, and 
other institutions have purposely been relegated to the background to isolate 
the significance of a single factor that had not yet been submitted to com­
parative empirical verification. Remembering that Huntington (1991) listed 
no fewer than 27 variables in his account of how democratic regimes 
emerge and consolidate, state capacity can be only one among many factors.
The demonstrations conducted in this article allow us to reach three basic 
conclusions about the importance of state capacity in explaining regime out­
comes. First, the qualitative methodology of necessary and sufficient causa­
tion provides strong evidence that a certain level o f state capacity appears to 
be a necessary condition for democracy. The scope of the challenge postcom­
munist countries faced after the demise of state socialism was extremely 
broad. It involved economic transformation, democratic transition, state 
reconstruction, the resurgence of civil society, the formation of political par­
ties, a complete reorientation of foreign and security policies and, for some, 
even a reconfiguration of national identities (Sakwa, 1999). As the results 
presented in this article make clear, some countries were more or less suc­
cessful at implementing these changes because the capacity of the state in the 
early years of transition, its strength or weakness, has set the limits o f reform 
agendas that they could reasonably undertake (Roberts & Sherlock, 1999). 
The varying capacities of states in the early years after their release from 
communism gave way to different constraints on policy makers about the 
available options for conducting both economic and political reforms.
Second, multivariate quantitative analyses also demonstrate the existence 
of a strong and clear empirical relationship between state capacity and 
democracy among postcommunist countries over time. In that regard, this
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article’s findings run counter to Remington’s (2006) assertion that young 
democracies should perform worst at protecting property and contractual 
rights. All the democratic regimes contained in this study are nested within 
the strongest states, to be exact, the best protectors of property and contract 
rights. Conversely, there is greater variability of state capacity in semiauto- 
cratic and authoritarian states. Stronger states are not linearly associated with 
better democracy scores in such categories, nor do young autocracies per­
form better at protecting property rights and enforcing contracts.
The state “is crucial in constituting social order, in enabling regular and 
peaceful private relations among groups and individuals” (Przeworski, 1995, 
p. 110) because it makes interactions among groups and individuals more 
predictable. Consequently, the less capacity a state has at its disposal, the 
more difficult it becomes to perform the tasks associated with modern state­
hood (Easter, 2002). When the institutions of the state are not able to enforce 
rights and obligations, the state’s claims on the monopoly of violence and 
resources can be more easily challenged. Furthermore, when the state cannot 
fulfill its obligations, individuals turn to alternative channels to satisfy their 
needs, thus explaining the rise o f private protection rackets in Russia to cope 
for the state’s inability to guarantee security for individuals in the early 1990s 
(Volkov, 2002). Therefore, in states where leaders most successfully accom­
plish the tasks associated with statehood, the introduction of a rational tax 
collection administration, infrastructure reform, keeping corruption under 
control, and protecting property rights, democracy levels are generally the 
highest. However, unlike the findings of Cheibub (1998), who hypothesized 
that democracies are more likely than authoritarian regimes to assemble the 
conditions necessary for an effective tax system, the present findings suggest 
that the causal arrow might point the other way as well: Democracy is more 
likely to have emerged in countries with the most effective tax systems within 
a few years from independence.
Related to this point, the third and final conclusion is that the direction 
of the causality between these variables cannot be established in only one 
direction, which indicates that state capacity and levels o f democracy have 
mutually constitutive relationships. In other words, strong state capacity is 
associated with democracy, whereas high democratic performance is also 
driving higher state capacity scores. Although Remington (2006) argues 
that “democratization does not necessarily improve institutional capacity” 
(p. 289), results from this group of countries show that high levels of democ­
racy did in fact have positive impacts on capacity. Nevertheless, I concur 
with Remington that a weak state is more susceptible to capture and corrup­
tion: The nuance I want to bring is that a weak state most likely will not be
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democratic. In the end, it is perhaps reassuring that the direction of causality 
cannot be established beyond doubt simply through statistical modeling; 
social reality is more disorderly than the simplified representations these 
models offer. Because the statistical tests performed in this article fall short 
o f establishing clear temporally causal relationships between variables of 
interest, further examination through detailed qualitative case studies would 
likely be necessary to unearth the deeper causal underpinnings behind these 
empirical relationships.
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Notes
1. Both Back and Hadenius (2008) and Charron and Lapuente (2010) use a two- 
item composite index o f state capacity combining “bureaucratic quality” and 
“level o f perceived corruption” from Political Risk Services’ International Coun­
try Risk Guide data.
2. Central and Eastern European countries also underwent radical border modi­
fications at the end o f  the Second World War. W ith the Treaty o f  Paris o f  
1947, changes were enacted between the H ungarian-Slovak and R om anian- 
Hungarian borders (Transylvania was given back to Romania from Hungary, 
where it rem ained only a few years after the Ribbentrop-M olotov Pact). With 
the Yalta Accords, Poland saw its borders shifted more than 200 kilometers to 
the west, so that large amounts o f  territory were redistributed among Ukraine, 
Belarus and Lithuania, whereas its western boundaries were also relocated far­
ther to the west, taking in former German territory on the Oder-N eisse Line.
3. For an in-depth discussion o f  index construction, particularly the issues o f valid­
ity and reliability, see Fortin (2010).
4. In this study, both measures were transformed to vaiy in the same direction, from 
autocracy to democracy, and standardized for increments to be on the same scale. 
Pearson’s r between both indices is .9, and Cronbach’s a is .95.
5. W hen both the working and the alternative hypotheses are set at 50%.
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6. This posterior probability given the data was calculated using the All Cases 
Design P (WH|D) = P (WH) / (P (WH) + P (AH) * 1 /  (a + c + d + 3».
7. An F  test indicated that the null hypothesis o f no effects should be rejected. The 
addition o f  country dummy variables should account for the remaining possibility 
o f intercept differences across units. It is important to note that the addition ofthese 
variables can bias downward the coefficients o f  those variables whose effects are 
partly cross-sectional.
8. Although no strict minimum rule exists for T, Nathaniel Beck (2001, p. 274) 
cautions practitioners to be suspicious when time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) 
methods are used when T < 10, although the rule can be more flexible for the 
number o f  cross-sectional observations.
9. Five completed data sets (in the form o f  TSCS) were created, thus imputing miss­
ing data five times, all using independent draws, in an attempt to approximate the 
true distributional relationship between these missing data and the information 
that is already present in the data set. About 25% o f values were missing for tax 
revenue and contract intensive money at t = 0, whereas practically no values 
were missing after the first year.
10. To detect serially correlated errors, a Lagrange multiplier test was performed. 
This was accomplished by an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equation 
o f  the fully specified model and then regressing the residuals on all the inde­
pendent variables and the lagged residuals. Since the coefficient on the lagged 
residual was statistically significant, I had to reject the null hypothesis o f inde­
pendent errors. From this perspective, it becomes safest to assume that we are in 
the presence o f  first-order autocorrelation AR( 1).
11. Although some question the linearity o f these findings (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010 ).
12. These were partially addressed by the addition o f  a lagged dependent variable. 
Because o f  almost perfect collinearity, the measure o f  distance from each coun­
try’s capital to Brussels cannot be used together with the least square dummy 
variable and is not included in Model 3.
13. Further confirming these results, a cross-sectional OLS regression (not shown) 
explaining the difference in levels o f  democracy between t = 0 and 2005 with 
the level o f  democracy at t = 0 and difference in state capacity between t = 0 
and 2005 yielded an adjusted R2 o f  .41. With the addition o f GDP per capita, the 
adjusted R2 rose to .48. In all models, the variable depicting the change in state 
capacity scores remained statistically significant.
14. However not all agree that modernization is the principal explanatory variable 
for levels o f  democracy; see Arat (1988 ) and Gonick and Rosh (1988 ).
15. The variance inflation factor used to quantify the severity o f  multicollinearity is 
highest for GDP per capita in Model 3 (24.19). Also, the large condition number 
(indicator o f the global instability o f  regression coefficients) o f  17, indicates
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many collinear relations among the regressors o f Model 3 (Fox, 1997, pp. 350- 
351). However, even in the face ofmulticollinearity, OLS estimates remain unbi­
ased (Berry & Feldman, 1985). Hence, it follows that the inflated standard errors 
should typically lead us to underestimate the significance o f  the estimators, not 
overestimate them, lending additional confidence to the results presented in 
Table 2.
16. Pearson’s r between the two variables is .77.
17. These tests were conducted on all five imputed data sets. Similar results were 
obtained for all data sets with significant F  test results up to two lags.
18. Taken at face value, the results o f  the Granger causality tests involving state 
capacity seem disappointing. One way to interpret these findings is that Granger 
causality is limited to linear change. Since we already know from graphical evi­
dence that the relationship between our variables o f  interest is not linear, it is 
probable that the tests overlook much o f  the nonlinear variance at work. Second, 
this test can be performed only on pairs o f  variables and may produce misleading 
results when more than two variables are known to have an impact, such as in 
the present case. Last, our measurements are imperfect depictions o f broad and 
abstract concepts. We cannot hope to achieve the same kind o f  precision with 
such crude measures as with detailed economic data gathered on a weekly basis 
over long periods o f  time.
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